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Abstract 
Most companies in the world are owned by families, and a majority of 
them are registered in countries where the legal protection of minority 
shareholders is weak. Is family control the consequence of the lack of 
investor protection?   It is known that agency problems among owners 
actually increase in family-ownership situations, so family control by itself 
may not be an efficient substitute for the legal protection of minority 
investors.  In this article we analyze successful strategies used by Canadian 
and Latin American business groups and firms to increase the satisfaction 
of their minority shareholders and to limit the incentives of the controlling 
shareholders to abuse them, and predict the outcomes of that protection. 
From these experiences we are able to suggest some conditions that are 
required in order for family control to be an effective response to the lack 
of legal investor protection. 
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Introduction 
What happens to minority stakeholders when they operate in locations that do not protect 
their rights?  Intuition, supported by a wealth of anecdotal evidence and some academic research, 
show that whenever a locale does not have a comprehensive protection of minority stakeholder 
rights, their interests tend not to be catered to as much as they would in minority-friendly 
locations.   The mechanisms deployed to abuse the rights of minority stakeholders are multiple 
and quite well-known, and range from the internal consumption of profits to the transfer of assets 
at below-market prices (“tunneling”), and include other well-known tricks such as manipulation 
of transfer prices within conglomerates among many others.  Indeed, it is precisely the lack of 
minority shareholder protection that has pushed some authors to explain the relative 
underdevelopment of the capital markets of most emerging economies, including obviously Latin 
American ones.  ( A notable exception is La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000;  
A notable exception is 2002, who study the consequences of varying degrees of minority 
shareholder protection on the structure of ownership.) 
What happens when, in addition to these considerations about the regulatory system, we 
add the fact that most of these firms are closely-held family firms (henceforth family firms or 
FF? (see La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999)  If, as Leon Tolstoy claimed, “all 
happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” we could reasonably 
expect the presence of the family to have a significant impact on firm behavior.  Both academic 
research and practical experience show us that agency problems increase when the family 
dimension is incorporated into the analysis, so one can safely conclude that family control of 
firms, whether the family is happy or not, may not be a very efficient substitute for the legal 
protection of minority investors.   
Yet, empirical evidence shows that at least some large, multinational FF do protect the 
rights of their minority shareholders, whether the law requires them to do so or not and, more to 
the point, whether the minority shareholders are related to the core of the family or not.  Thus, we 
believe it is necessary to understand what are the mechanisms that these FF use to align the 
incentives of all stakeholders, controlling or minority, employed by the firm or not, and later 
evaluate whether they are idiosyncratic or, conversely, they can be generalized to a larger 
population of FF. 
Accordingly, this paper consists of three main sections.  In the first one, we develop a 
literature review on the two problems that concern us.  First, we focus on closely held FF, on 






Second, we focus on minority shareholder protection.  On the second part of the paper, we 
integrate these two phenomena into a matrix that describes four archetypical behaviors, and 
present the model resulting from their interaction.  We then present a series of propositions 
issued from our theoretical understanding of the problem, and conclude with suggestions for 
empirical testing of the model and further empirical research.   
Family firms and protection of minority shareholders: an overview 
It is an often-neglected fact that firms outside the USA and the UK are generally not 
widely held, but controlled by families (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; 
Randall Morck, 2000; R. Morck & Yeung, 2001; Sharma, Chrisman, & Chua, 1996; Shepherd & 
Zacharakis, 2000).  This fact, which a superficial analysis could link to a primitive phase on the 
development of a fully developed capitalist economy, is also true in the US, where 30% of the 
Fortune 500 firms, which in turn account for about 50% of US GDP (Aronoff, Astrachan, & 
Ward, 1996; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) and employ about 80% of the active population, are 
controlled by families (Gudmundson, Hartman, & Tower, 1999).  Family firms, thus, matter. 
Research on family firms provides important insights on their behaviors and motivations.  
In his review of the literature, Dyer outlines some important dimensions that distinguish the 
behavior of family firms and publicly traded ones (Dyer (Jr), 2001).  Specifically, family firms 
tend to have strategic orientations that are different than publicly owned firms (Gudmundson, 
Hartman, & Tower, 1999), to choose low-risk strategies that contribute to maintain control of the 
firm’s ownership in the hands of the actual shareholders (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999)and to 
adopt business goals that are congruent with the larger goals of the family  (Tagiuri & Davis, 
1992). Also, we know that family firms actively use family values to decide of asset allocation 
and deployment (Harris, Martinez, & Ward, 1994; Kahn & Henderson, 1992; Tagiuri & Davis, 
1992), and we suspect that they may have a longer term perspective than public firms(Porter, 
1992).    
In addition to behaving idiosyncratically, family firms have also two structural 
characteristics that distinguish them substantively from other forms of ownership.  A salient 
feature is that they tend to be controlled by relatively small parties of closely related individuals, 
whose control is typically dominant and uncontested (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, Shleifer, & 






these controlling individuals have a direct participation in the management of the firm, often 
(though not always) as members of the top management team, which gives them considerable 
power over these firms, typically beyond their cash-flow rights. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Salinas, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999)  
As a consequence of this situation, the main conflict of interest in family firms becomes 
the expropriation, often legal, of minority shareholders and creditors by the controlling 
shareholder rather than the common conflict of interests between professional managers and 
shareholders. As discussed, this expropriation may take a wide variety of forms, some of which 
are legal in some locations but illegal in others. (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 2000).  This agency problem is qualitatively different from the ones that affect large 
dispersed-ownership firms.  Ever since Berle and Means (Berle & Means, 1932, who observed  
that control of the large corporation was shifting from stockholders to professional managers, the 
latter has been the archetype of the American firms studied in the literature, where ownership and 
management were separated.  Traditional agency theorists affirmed that family firms were not as 
affected by the agency problems prevalent in this type of ownership, implying, if implicitly, that 
family firms were better at protecting minority shareholders, particularly when these were family 
members.  Fama an Jensen, for example, claimed that family management of a family controlled 
firm is an efficient mechanism to solve agency problems that could arise in other ownership 
arrangements {Fama, 1983 #1951).  Tolstoy was right: a happy family was all you needed. 
In spite of Fama´s optimism, we know now that agency problems associated with private 
ownership and owner management are exacerbated, not diminished by the family relations that 
are foundational dimensions of family firms.  As Morck claims, these firms have a radically 
different “political economy”, which in turn affects the dynamics of the economies in which they 
operate (R. Morck & Yeung, 2001).  Contrary to the romantic view of family ties presented by 
Fama and Jensen, research has shown that family firms suffer from agency problems that are 
generic to other firms and, in addition, from some that arise from the peculiar nature of the 
relationship between owners.  For example, Schulz and associates empirically show that 
altruism, prevalent in family firms, creates a host of additional problems to family firm.  These 
can be summarized in three categories: agency costs of monitoring agents who are also family 
members, agency costs of monitoring owners that are also members of the family, and 
configurations of agency threats, where control mechanisms aggravate each other, exacerbating 






As mentioned, much of the research on large, tightly controlled FF focuses on family 
dynamics and their consequences for firm behaviors.  A common research stream, for example, 
studies the consequences of unusual family events on the firm, such as succession, retirement, 
incorporation of new family members (see, for example P. Davis & Harveston, 1999; P. S. Davis 
& Harveston, 1998; Gudmundson, Hartman, & Tower, 1999; see, for example Miller, Steier, & 
Le Breton-Miller, 2004; Shepherd & Zacharakis, 2000), or, conversely, on the consequences of 
firm events of the family. (Dyer (Jr.), 1986).    While comparative research across family firms is 
common, research analyzing the consequences of different environmental conditions on family 
firm behavior is much rarer, probably because of the complexities of the data gathering.   
(Examples to the contrary can be found in Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003 and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Salinas, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999) 
Difficulties aside, we believe it is important to link firm behavior to environmental 
conditions, and predict the outcomes of the model.   More specifically, we believe that one of the 
most important environmental variables for large firms has to be the degree of sophistication of 
the capital markets in which the firm operates.  It has been argued (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) that one of the factors that affects the development of capital markets 
is the protection they offer to minority investors and its enforceability, and the stability of these 
rules or, at least, of the core of these rules.  This is so because these rules determine to a large 
extent the propensity of outside investors to join as minority shareholders in a firm controlled by 
someone else (or, in Adam Smith´s terms, “other people´s money”), including families.  In the 
next section we examine minority shareholder protection in that context. 
Minority shareholder´s protection 
One potential weakness of Schulz and associates study is the peculiar contextual 
conditions of the sample.  It has been known that gathering useful and reliable data on family 
firms is particularly difficult (Wortman Jr, 1994), a fact Schulz et al (2001) examine 
comprehensively and address in their methodology section, but less emphasis is placed on the 
regulatory framework under which the firm operates.  Specifically, their study is biased by the 
fact that firms in the sample operate in the USA, a society that protects to a large extent the rights 
of minority stakeholders, possessing a judicial system that works reasonably well.  In the USA, 
and unlike most of the world, a disgruntled shareholder can expect a legal system that guarantees 






Yet, if we are to understand FF and their behavior, we need study firms that operate in 
different legal frameworks.  What happens, for example, when the minority shareholder of a 
family firm who is typically also a family member, is certain that taking grievances to court is a 
waste of time and money?  Under these circumstances, one can expect at least some reticence 
from family members to invest in a firm they do not control, in spite of the family ties. In 
addition, and exacerbating the same phenomenon, very few external investors will invest in 
family firms as minority shareholders under these conditions, and those who do will require 
considerable premiums to do so.  As far as family members goes, one could expect high 
instability of this structural arrangement in those family members who do not control the firm 
and/or manage it.   Yet, if this is the case, why are there so many family firms with so many 
minority stakeholders, even in locations with weak legal protection? 
We believe the answer has to do with a combination of two dimensions: the legal 
protection available in the locale where the firm operates, and the actions of the firm to enhance 
that protection whether the law requires it or not.  Simply stated, firm behavior replaces legal 
protection.  We do not invoke here moral reasoning (although we do not deny it may be present) 
but competitive advantage: firms that protect their minority shareholders will have considerable 
advantages over those that do not.   The argument is simple: as in any fiduciary relationship, the 
relationship between the firm and its investors must be based on trust. It is the lack of trust what 
makes us rely on the legal system to provide protection against the expropriation of minority 
investors.   
Family ties can be seen as providing bonds of trust that can substitute those that are 
supposed to be provided by the legal system. This has lead some authors (see, for example, 
Panunzi, Burkart, & Shleifer, 2002) to propose that family firms are more common in countries 
with weak protection of minority investors precisely because family ownership is a substitute for 
the legal protection of minority investors.   But this is based on either of two implicit 
assumptions: (i) that agency problems do not exist when the agent and the principal are members 
of the same family, or (ii) the family has internal mechanisms to deal with such problems 
whenever they exist. Given that there is plenty of evidence that agency problems indeed occur in 
family firms, a common weakness of this kind of study is therefore the lack of descriptions about 
the mechanisms, and their effectiveness, used by family firms to deal with agency problems.  For 
an early and more thorough survey of this strand of the literature, see (La Porta, Lopez-De-






Combining Family Dynamics and Investor Protection: a typology of Family Firms 
Environments 
In this section we combine two dimensions, family dynamics and legal investor 
protection to define four different types of environments. Family firms in each of them will be 
faced with specific challenges that will require different responses. Therefore, it is important for 
a family firm to identify in which of these categories it fits, and behave accordingly. 
 
Insert Figure 1 
about here 
 
Clearly, the best environment for a family firm is the upper left quadrant (rules reinforce 
family). When the family controlling the firm has a good family dynamic, and the firm is at a 
locale that provides strong protection for minority investors, the FF is in an ideal position to 
become successful. Then we have the situation in the lower left quadrant (rules replace family). 
A FF in this environment can not only survive but also be successful, because a strong protection 
to minority investors may allow shareholder conflicts steaming from family feuds to be solved 
through the legal system. In third place we can turn to the upper right quadrant (family replaces 
law). A good family dynamic can compensate for the lack of minority shareholders, even if the 
latter are no members of the family. However, its effectiveness will diminish as the ties between 
shareholders become more diffuse, making FF particularly vulnerable as it progresses trough the 
generational transitions. Finally, FF in the lower left quadrant (downhill) face a complicated 
situation, and may not able to attract any kind of minority shareholder, or even to keep the 
current ones.  We now illustrate each of these categories with a real life example. 
 







Downhill: El Periódico de hoy 
El Periódico de Hoy (Today’s Newspaper) is the leading Newspapers Company in one 
Latin American country. As most Latin American Newspapers, El Periódico is a family own 
business. But rather than being the solution to the weak legal protection of minority investors 
prevailing in the country, family ownerships actually presents a huge risk for the continuity of the 
firm because family problems have been translated to the company’s operations. 
The risk comes from a family feud that has started to take its toll on the company. The 
firm is currently owned by brothers of a prominent family (second generation). The problems 
started a few years ago when a conflict among the brothers produced a rift in the family that is 
still to be repaired. Then, one of the brothers took advantage of a complicated ownership 
structure to take control of the company. It then proceed to exclude the other branches of the 
family from the decision making process of the company, even tough they hold more than 60% 
of the outstanding voting shares. 
In turn, the other two branches of the family got together and challenged, successfully, for 
the control of the firm. Once in power, they decided to exclude the previous controlling group 
from the decision making process. They also turned around El Periódico, which yielded profits 
for the first time in several years. You could think that this will have relaxed the tension around 
the control of the firm, but it ended up being exactly the opposite. The new success of the 
company awakened new conflicts when the CEO of El Periódico, a family member, started to 
cash out bonuses for the good performance, while the shareholders where not receiving that 
much through dividends due to an ambitious expansion plan that demanded big investments. 
Eventually the situation reached unmanageable levels, and the family was forced to look 
for outside help to try to improve the situation. The approach was to simply look at the corporate 
charter and see what kind of provisions could be established in order to prevent situations like 
this to arise again, as well a to provide minority investors, which by the time were all family 
members, with a more sounding legal framework to protect their investment. One of the first 
issues tackled was to simplify the ownership structure, in order to make it more transparent. 






succession to the third generation is hanging over El Periódico as a defining test moment for how 
well the corporate governance mechanisms will be able to compensate for a family situation that 
more likely will continue to be problematic. 
This case illustrates two important concepts. The first one, at the core of our argument, 
even though family ownership can be a substitute for the lack of legal protection to minority 
investors, this needs not be the case, and it can backfire, making the minority situation worse 
even if all shareholders are members of the same family. Therefore, it is simply not right to just 
assume that family ownership is always an optimal solution to the lack of legal protection. In 
second place, in our experience most family firms with similar problems will try to solve them by 
improving corporate governance mechanisms first, and then only after that they will address the 
family problems. This is probably due to the fact that corporate governance can be deal with in a 
business setting, while family problems need to be solved in a more personal and perhaps not so 
rational level. 
Family Reinforces Rules: Electrodomésticos Moravia 
Electrodómesticos Moravia is a Central American family-owned Multinational that sells 
appliances. The controlling shareholder commanded an initiative to change the corporate charter, 
self-limiting his own ability to make decisions, in order to protect the interest of the minority in a 
hypothetical conflict of interest. In particular, he offered that major strategic decisions like capital 
increases, appointments to the board of directors, joint ventures, etc, require it at least 80% of the 
votes (which he did not control, forcing him into alliances with minority shareholders), rather 
than just a simple majority (which he could do of his own volition). 
The main goal of this decision was to lock the commitment of some key members of the 
family with the future development of the company, principally with its geographic expansion. 
These family members had the abilities and capital required to turn the-up-to-that moment local 
firm into a multinational with operations in three countries, becoming in a short period of time 
one of the regional leaders in the industry. 
In this case there was a strong family bond between the founder and controlling 






strong enough for the latter to commit their funds and time to the firm.  Even though these other 
family members were to be responsible for the operations of the company in other countries, they 
also wanted a say in the corporate matters.  This goal was accomplish through a shareholder 
agreement and some modifications to the corporate charter. 
In the process, the family decided to include other matters like succession, employment of 
family members, etc, as part of the shareholder agreement. Some of these were really not 
required for the expansion project, since the second generation was still young and the third was 
using diapers at most, but it was accomplish taking advantage of the favorable climate created by 
the whole process. 
There are two notable points in this example. First, the process was triggered by the 
expansion project, and the family members that were considered where those that could precisely 
contribute to the mentioned project.  Not all the family members were included in the 
shareholder agreement. However, the agreement would not have been possible if the investors 
involved were not family members, since at the time the founder was very reluctant to share 
power.  Second, the final result put the FF in a position where it can attract new minority 
investors from outside the family, if desired. 
Rules replace family: McCain Foods Limited 
McCain Foods Ltd. (MFL) is the world’s largest maker of French fries, invoicing roughly 
6.5 billion US dollars in 2003 in over 55 countries.  It is also an excellent example of a company 
that thrived in spite of a bitter dispute among its owners and founders, brothers Harrison and 
Wallace McCain, thanks to the presence of a legal system that protected some basic rights of the 
minority shareholders. (A full account of the McCain family and company can be found in 
Waldie, 1994; A full account of the McCain family and company can be found in Woloschuk, 
1995) 
Founded in New Brunswick, Canada, in 1956 by four brothers (Harrison, Wallace, Robert 
and Andrew McCain), the company grew without attracting much attention until 1993, when 
Wallace and Harrison McCain, co-CEOs for nearly 40 years, disagreed on who should succeed 






run the company, Harrison wanted to appoint his nephew Allison.  After months of bitter dispute, 
the issue was taken to the New Brunswick courts, which eventually sided with Harrison. 
(Anonymous, 1995; Newman, 1998b)  
As a consequence of the sentence, Harrison took over the control of the company, firing 
Wallace and his sons from any executive positions in MFL, and went on to appoint Allison as 
Deputy Chairman in 1999, and in 2002 CEO of the group of companies.  The brothers never 
reconciled after the court sentence, and remained disgruntled until the death of Harrison in March 
2004.  (Anonymous, 1995; Newman, 1998b)  
Yet, in spite of the animosity, Wallace and his family retained at least 1/3 of all company 
shares, and never suffered any discrimination from his brothers.   In addition to the 
unquestionable morals of Harrison, Canadian law protects minority stakeholders in firms or 
groups of firms from a form of expropriation called “tunnelling”, where profits from one firm are 
transferred to the controlling firm until most profits remain at the group level, typically wholly 
controlled by a small group of individuals.  The Canadian Business Corporation Act, in the 
section dedicated to “oppression remedy”, protects minority shareholders when they feel their 
company is tunnelling profits to another company rather than distribute them.  It has been 
reported that this provision is the most frequently used corporate governance legislation in 
Canada. (Randall Morck, Stangeland, & Yeung, 2000.; R. Morck & Yeung, 2001)  
Our interpretation of this situation is simple: since Canadian law protected Wallace and 
other minority shareholders, Harrison had powerful incentives to treat him lawfully even after a 
bitter dispute over the destiny of the company.  The family, once united, had become deeply 
divided, but the law was effective enough to avoid abuses of power from the majority 
shareholder, in spite of his feelings towards his brothers.  In fact, MLF continued to grow after 
Wallace´s departure, making Harrison and Wallace both very rich.  So much so, in fact, that the 
magazine Forbes in 2004 listed Wallace McCain as being 30% richer than Harrison, to a large 
extent thanks to his shares in MFL.  Our analysis is partly confirmed by a comment by Allison, 
who in 1999 said “"If we are talking about a pure business issue, everybody (the owners) gets 
along fine (…) In matters that were in dispute among the family, well, I don't think people have 






Rules reinforce family: Bombardier INC. 
Bombardier, the second largest industrial group in Canada, was founded in the 30s by 
Joseph-Armand Bombardier in Valcourt, a small town in Québec.  From its origins as a 
manufacturer of small snowmobiles, Bombardier has become a multinational group with interests 
in defense, aerospace, mass transportation and engineering.  (Maclean's, 2000) 
Joseph Bombardier created the company and made it prosperous for almost thirty years.  
However, his death at a young age after a long disease proved a difficult challenge for the 
company.  No son or daughter was ready to take control, and the company had never been 
managed by anyone but Mr. Bombardier himself.  After long family deliberations (with the 
collaboration of Mr. Bombardier), the family appointed Joseph’s son-in-law Laurent Beaudoin, 
who became Chairman of the Board of the Bombardier group of companies shortly after Joseph’s 
death.  The arrangement had come from a strong consensus within the closely-knit family, and 
continued for many years.  Since the arrival of Mr Beaudoin to the head of Bombardier, the 
company has continued to grow.   
Mr. Beaudoin’s tenure was so successful that the company, already prosperous, 
diversified into mass transportation and aerospace, becoming, according to some, the only 
challenger to Boeing and Airbus (Economist, 1997) and a dominant player in the Regional Jets 
segment of the aircraft industry.  When he retired in 1998, Mr Beaudoin chose an outsider over 
Mr. Joseph Bombardier’s son, in a move that had the approval of the family (who at the time still 
had 62% of the voting shares) and was widely applauded by market analysts. (Newman, 1998a)  
Growth required capital, and Bombardier Inc was quite successful in attracting it.  For 
example, in late 2003, a US equity firm bought another 10% of Bombardier’s recreational 
division, bringing its total ownership to 50%.  The fact the Bombardier-Beaudoin family still 
controls Bombardier Inc through a complex voting share structure did not prevent Bain co and 
the Caisse de Depots du Québec (Québec’s pension plan and Canada’s largest asset manager) 
from acquiring a large part of the recreational division.  In this case, the presence of a functional 
family in control of the firm, together with a legal system that preserves the interest of the 
minority shareholders created a situation where new capital could be attracted without 






conditions for the firm.  (Chipello, 2003; Watson & Kirby, 2003) 
This is a fine example of the positive interaction between a functional family and an 
environment with rules that protect the interest of minority shareholders.  The Bombardier-
Beaudoin family had no trouble making consensual decisions that were crucial to the company 
(including bringing in-laws and outsiders into the top management of the firm), balancing the 
interest of the family and the competitiveness of the firm.  In addition, however, they benefited 
from a legislation that allowed the minority investors to take legal actions whenever they felt that 
were mistreated by the controlling family. 
Integrating Family Firms and Investor Protection: a framework 
We are primarily interested in the ability that a firm has to seize new opportunities, 
particularly when they require resources and capabilities that are not controlled by the firm.  We 
believe that in these cases, new partnerships are required, often involving the participation of 
new minority shareholders.  Yet, it is not merely a matter of attracting new shareholders, but 
good shareholders who can provide the expertise and the capital required to transform the 
opportunity into a successful business.  The ability to attract them, we believe, is function of both 
the quantity of potential partners to select from, and of their quality, defined as the 
complementarity with the current assets and skills of the firm and the distance to the assets and 
skills needed to seize the opportunity. 
As the model illustrates, both quality and quantity depend on the degree to which the firm 
protects its minority shareholders.   As discussed, this degree of protection is closely related to 
the legal requirements of the environment in which the firm operates, but also to the family 
dynamics.  For the former variable, degree of protection does not refer to how good the family 
dynamics are or how well minority shareholders are treated when they are also family members.   
Rather, it refers to the way a good family dynamics is translated into rules created by the firm that 
bind the behaviour of managers and owners alike (such as shareholder agreements, or charters 
that require wide consensus on important decisions), well beyond what the law requires.  Given 
that, as we know, most firms operate on environments with quite weak protection for minority 
shareholders, we believe that the last variable is crucial in explaining why some family firms are 







Insert Figure 2 
about here 
 
Conclusions and suggestion for further research. 
This paper studies the interaction between two forces that shape the behaviour of most 
business organizations: weak legal protection for minority shareholders and family ownership.  
By integrating these two facts in a matrix, we are able to create a typology of firm environments 
that distinguishes behaviours according to the degree of protection required by the legal system 
in which the firm operates and the dynamics of the family that controls the firm. 
Using the typology as a platform, we then create a model that shows how both family 
dynamics and legal environment can help predict both the quantity and the quality of minority 
shareholders the firm will be able to attract, and as a consequence, the range of opportunities the 
firm will be able to detect and seize, particularly when these opportunities stretch the firm 
beyond its current capabilities.  Our model develops testable propositions about the relationships 
among these variables. 
Our typology and the model has substantive implications for business managers, as it 
clarifies what actions ought to be taken to improve the likelihood of identifying and seizing 
business opportunities that require capital and/or expertise beyond the control of the firm.  Firms 
that combine good family dynamics with a legal environment that protects the rights of minority 
shareholders are in an ideal situation to attract new, minority investors, as the rule of law and the 
behaviour of the family preserve the rights of the new partners.  Firms that operate in 
environments where the laws are weak or not enforced adequately need to find mechanisms to 
embed minority shareholder protection within the firm by using adequate instruments to the task, 
such as making modifications to the charter, or getting into shareholder agreements that require 
consensus rather than simple majorities to make substantive decisions.  Conversely, firms that 






families or families with issues that require attention would benefit from using tools that improve 
the family dynamics and provide them with mechanisms to solve the problems of the family.  
Finally, firms that combine both dysfunctional families with weak legal protection benefit from 
addressing both problems, although not simultaneously.   
Our model predicts that these firms would benefit most from creating rules to protect 
minority shareholders first (which may or may not include members of the family).  Rather than 
being tacit, these rules should be made as explicit and comprehensive as possible, to ensure that 
the protection is not simply for family members but also for any investor with a potential stake in 
the company.  We believe that these rules may also help to address some of the issues that create 
conflicts within the families.  Once minority shareholder protection is firmly embedded, family 
issues can be addressed using tools designed to improve decision processes within the family. 
The implications for researchers are clear.  A natural sequel to this work would involve 
its empirical validation.  Although we do not foresee particular problems in its 
operationalization, data gathering could be difficult.  As documented by Schulze, data gathering 
about family firms is difficult, and the cross national nature of the model will certainly add 
another layer of complexity.  To address these issues, we believe that the multi-case 
methodologies proposed by Eisenhardt and associates (Eisenhardt, 1989, , 1991) could provide 
useful, as they resolve the problems inherent with massive data gathering while still preserving 
the robustness of the data and the validity of the comparisons across data points and cases.  Yet, 
in spite of the practical difficulties, we believe that this is an area that deserves further attention 
from management scholars, both because of the prevalence of the phenomena studied and the 
consequences it has for many business firms.  Finally, a better understanding of the dynamics of 
minority shareholder protection and the consequences for firm behaviour could serve as a useful 
platform for public policy modification, a necessary step in many countries that aspire to 
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Figure 1: A typology of Family Firms Environments 
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